Aesthetic hedonism is the view that to be aesthetically good is to please. For most aesthetic hedonists, aesthetic normativity is hedonic normativity. This paper argues that Kant’s third Critique contains resources for a nonhedonic account of aesthetic normativity as sourced in autonomy as self-legislation. A case is made that the account is also Kant’s because it ties his aesthetics into a key theme of his larger philosophy.

Aesthetic preferences and practices vary widely between individuals and between cultures. How should aesthetics proceed if we take this fact of aesthetic diversity, rather than the presumption of aesthetic universality, as our starting point? How should we theorize the cultural origins and cultural basis of aesthetic diversity? How should we think about the value and normativity of aesthetic diversity? In an effort to model what the turn toward diversity might look like in aesthetic inquiry, each author defends a different account (...) of aesthetic diversity, and they engage in a collective dialogue about these issues. (shrink)

One question that leads us into aesthetics is: why does beauty matter? Or, what do aesthetic goods bring to my life, to make it a life that goes well? Or, how does beauty deserve the place we have evidently made for it in our lives? A theory of aesthetic value states what beauty is so as to equip us to answer this question. According to aesthetic hedonism, aesthetic values are properties of items that stand in constitutive relation to pleasure. Contemporary (...) versions of aesthetic hedonism don’t explain what makes aesthetic values aesthetic, but they do explain what makes them normative, stating what makes it the case that aesthetic value facts lend weight to what an agent should do, for the fact that acting yields pleasure is always a reason to act. This book introduces and defends an alternative to aesthetic hedonism. According to the network theory, aesthetic value facts lend weight to its being an achievement for an agent to act. Since agents achieve by acting in coordination with one another, the theory takes seriously the sociality of aesthetic activity. The main argument for the network theory is that it better explains six facts about aesthetic activity than does aesthetic hedonism. The book also discusses the relationship between aesthetic value and pleasure, the point and distinctive character of aesthetic discourse, and the metaphysics of aesthetic value. Two final chapters use the network theory to shed light on how aesthetic value matters to us as individuals and as members of collectives. (shrink)

Images are double agents. They receive information from the world, while also projecting visual imagination onto the world. As a result, mind and world tug our thinking about images, or particular kinds of images, in contrary directions. On one common division, world traces itself mechanically in photographs, whereas mind expresses itself through painting.1 Scholars of photography disavow such crude distinctions: much recent writing attends in detail to the materials and processes of photography, the agency of photographic artists, and the social (...) determinants of the production and reception of photographs. As such writing makes plain, photographs cannot be reduced to mechanical traces.2 Yet background conceptions of photography as trace or index persist almost by default, as no framework of comparable explanatory power has yet emerged to replace them. A conception of photography adequate to developments in recent scholarship is long overdue. Rather than constructing such a conception top-down, as philosophers are wont to do, this paper articulates it by examining selected works by James Welling.3 There are several reasons for this: Welling’s practice persistently explores the resources and possibilities of photography, the effect of these explorations is to express a particular metaphysics of the mind’s relation to its world, and appreciating why this metaphysics is aptly expressed by exploring photography requires a revised conception of what photography is. In as much as it provides a framework for a richer interpretation of Welling, the new conception is also capable of underwriting a wide range of critical and historical approaches to photography. (shrink)

An approach to the semantics of fiction that uses the tools of truth relativism provides an alternative to Meinongian and pretence-based approaches. The approach is consistent with the deep motivations of John Wood's Truth in Fiction.

Cooperation among arts scholars is thought to be hampered by the division of research on the arts into two cultures, one scientific, one humanistic. This paper proposes an alternative model for research into the arts wherein multiple levels of explanation focussed on well-bounded phenomena integrate research across academic disciplines. Two case studies of research that fits the model are presented.

Feminists have always been concerned with how the clothes women wear can reinforce and reproduce gender hierarchy. However, they have strongly disagreed about what to do in response: some have suggested that the key to feminist liberation is to stop caring about how one dresses; others have replied that the solution is to give women increased choices. In this paper, we argue that neither of these dominant approaches is satisfactory and that, ultimately, they have led to an impasse that pervades (...) the contemporary feminist debate. The problem is that both sides of the debate understand women’s complicity in patriarchal subordination as a matter of what women wear and do. Instead, we propose a phenomenological analysis that understands complicity as based in our relations to our clothes. Starting from this phenomenological perspective, we sketch a new relational feminist ethics of dressing. This alternative ethical paradigm cannot yield a simple recipe for how to dress or tell us what garments are off-limits. But it can offer a way to make critical feminist judgements about clothes without veering into a stifling new prescriptivism. (shrink)

Theorists of aesthetic value since Hume have traditionally aimed to justify at least some comparative judgments of aesthetic value and to explain why we thereby have more reason to appreciate some aesthetic objects than others. I argue that three recent theories of aesthetic value—Thi Nguyen’s and Matthew Strohl’s engagement theories, Nick Riggle’s communitarian theory, and Dominic McIver Lopes’ network theory—face a challenge to carry out this explanatory task in a satisfactory way. I defend a monotonicity principle according to (...) which the strength of our aesthetic reasons to appreciate varies monotonically with aesthetic value and claim that these theories, because they do not respect the principle, are non-monotonic. If they cannot find a plausible way to preserve the link between the aesthetic goodness of an object and our aesthetic reasons to appreciate it, these non-monotonic theories should be rejected. (shrink)

In Beyond Art (2014), Dominic Lopes proposed a new theory of art, the buck passing theory. Rather than attempting to define art in terms of exhibited or genetic featured shared by all artworks, Lopes passes the buck to theories of individual arts. He proposes that we seek theories of music, painting, poetry, and other arts. Once we have these theories, we know everything there is to know about the theory of art. This essay presents two challenges to (...) the theory. First, this essay argues that Lopes is wrong in supposing that theories of arts were developed to deal with the ‘hard cases’ – developments such as Duchamp’s readymades and conceptual art. This is a problem since Lopes holds that the buck passing theory’s capacity to deal with the hard cases is one of its virtues. Second, this essay argues that the buck passing theory has no account of which activities are arts and no account of what makes some activity an art. (shrink)

A review of Aesthetic Life and Why It Matters (OUP, 2022), by Dominic McIver Lopes, Bence Nanay, and Nick Riggle. In this short but rich book, three leading specialists in aesthetics have teamed up to introduce the topic of aesthetics as a branch of value theory.

This paper summarises the main claims I have made in a series of publications on depiction. Having described six features of depiction that any account should explain, I sketch an account that does this. The account understands depiction in terms of the experience to which it gives rise, and construes that experience as one of resemblance. The property in respect of which resemblance is experienced was identified by Thomas Reid, in his account of ‘visible figure’. I defend the account against (...) certain criticisms, and compare it to some of its main rivals, in particular the views offered by Goodman, Wollheim and Dominic Lopes. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Jenefer Robinson’s personalist account of pictorial expression. [1] According to personalism, a picture possesses the expressive properties we attribute to it because we take it that someone expresses E in the work. Robinson’s particular strategy exploits the concept of an implied persona who ‘unifies’ and ‘specifies’ what is expressed. [2] Dominic Lopes challenges this view by attacking what he takes to be a flawed assumption motivating the personalist account: the priority of figure expression. (...) [3] Once we acknowledge this flaw, he argues, there is no good reason to prefer personalism to an impersonalist theory. I will argue that Robinson qua personalist can pre-empt this strike by clarifying the relation between (a) what a picture expresses and (b) what is depicted as expressing in the picture. Rather than leading with the idea that personalism unifies or determines the meaning, I argue that impersonalism diminishes it and that, should it be accepted, we would be left with an impoverished view of what specific art pieces can mean. (shrink)

According to buck-passers about art, such as Dominic Lopes, every work of art belongs to some art. I distinguish two versions of the buck-passing theory of art—what I call the double-buck-passers’ (DBP) view and the single-buck-passers’ (SBP) view—and point out that Lopes’s view is an instance of the latter. Then I argue the SBP view faces a dilemma, each horn of which leads to trouble. In doing so, I explore uncharted territory: the implications of vagueness for theories (...) of art. I conclude that buck-passers should not be single-buck-passers. (shrink)

What more do we need to fully appreciate perfumes, beyond considering them objects for aesthetic appreciation? My contention is that our appreciation of some perfumes would be largely incomplete, unless we acknowledged them as works of art. I defend the claim that some perfumes are works of art from the point of view of different definitions. Nick Zangwill’s aesthetic definition makes it easy to defend the proposed claim, but is not very informative for the purposes of fully appreciating some perfumes. (...) On the other hand, Jerrold Levinson’s intentional-historical definition and Dominic Lopes’s approach to defining art make it more challenging to defend the proposed claim. I show that, even so, the challenge may be met. Moreover, the challenge is well worth engaging with, since tackling it uncovers features of some perfumes that are essential to their full appreciation. (shrink)

How is it possible for a picture to depict a picture? Proponents of perceptual theories of depiction, who argue that the content of a picture is determined, in part, by the visual state it elicits in suitable viewers, that is, by a state of seeing-in, have given a plausible answer to this question. They say that a picture depicts a picture, in part, because, under appropriate conditions of observation, a suitable viewer will be able to see a picture in the (...) picture. In this article, I first argue that this answer is in conflict with the way in which some of the most influential perceptual theories of depiction – Robert Hopkins's version of the experienced resemblance theory and Dominic Lopes's version of the recognition theory – construe seeing-in. I then formulate a version of the recognition theory that avoids this conflict and show how it can explain the depiction of pictures. (shrink)

My main objective in this paper is to formulate a view of pictorial realism I call ‘hypothetical verity’. It owes much to John Kulvicki but diverges from his view in an important respect: rather than thinking that realistic pictures are true to our conceptions of things, I hold that they are true to what things would be like if they existed. In addition, I agree with Dominic Lopes that different realisms reflect different aspects of reality, but restate the (...) case without recourse to symbol systems. Together, the twin principles of hypothetical verity and aspectival absolutism constitute a theory of realism able to account for realistic fictional entities, the problem of revelatory realism and images that teach new information. (shrink)

This paper addresses what is arguably ?? one of the most fundamental questions in the debate on depiction, What is a Picture? It offers a critical discussion of traditional theories of pictorial representation, such as the Resemblance Theory, Conventionalism, and the Illusion Theory; it introduces and analyses the crucial notions of ‘seeing as’ and ‘seeing in’, and concludes by presenting some of the most recent accounts of depiction defended by Kendall Walton, Dominic Lopes, Robert Hopkins, and John Hyman.

Ce n'est pas en pensant que nous créons des mondes. C'est en comprenant le monde que nous apprenons à penser. La cosmovision est un terme qui devrait désigner un ensemble de fondements d'où émerge une compréhension systémique de l'Univers, de ses composantes comme la vie, le monde dans lequel nous vivons, la nature, le phénomène humain et leurs relations. C'est donc un champ de la philosophie analytique nourri par les sciences, dont l'objectif est cette connaissance agrégée et épistémologiquement soutenable de (...) tout ce que nous sommes et contenons, qui nous entoure, et qui nous concerne de quelques manières que ce soit. C'est quelque chose d'aussi vieux que la pensée humaine et, en plus d'utiliser des éléments de la cosmologie scientifique, il englobe tout ce qui, dans la philosophie et la science, se réfère à l'univers et à la vie. Une cosmovision n'est pas un ensemble d'idées, d'hypothèses et de suppositions, mais un système établi sur l'observation, l'analyse, la preuve et la démonstration. Aucune cosmovision n'entend définir, établir ou proposer, mais seulement comprendre, analyser et interpréter. Chacun de nous construit et transporte sa cosmovision tout au long de sa vie, sans établir de forme, comme toile de fond de nos pensées et de nos comportements. Linguistiquement, le terme « cosmovision » dériverait de l'allemand, équivalent au concept de « Weltanschauung », tel qu'il a été utilisé par plusieurs philosophes. Cependant, cette relation linguistique n'est pas applicable, car elle contredit ce que nous proposons comme cosmovision. Ce mot allemand fait référence à une vision prélogique ou proto-expérimentale de la réalité, avec un contexte intuitif et loin des connaissances critiques encore inexistantes au moment de sa formulation. Sans aucun doute, les cosmovisions, au sens où nous les entendons, abritent et utilisent ces éléments proto-expérimentaux ou prélogiques qui incluent l'histoire, l'inconscient collectif et tous les archétypes que nous portons. Or, dans le concept que nous appliquons ici, la cosmovision va bien au-delà de ce contenu, d'abord en le soumettant constamment à la pensée critique actuelle et enfin en faisant de l'expérience analytique (et non de la pensée elle-même ou de l'intuition) son univers réel. António Lopes expose l'étendue de ce contenu : [ ] « Les cosmovisions ne sont pas le produit de la pensée. Ils ne naissent pas du simple désir de savoir. L'appréhension de la réalité est un moment important dans sa configuration, mais, néanmoins, ce n'en est qu'un. Elle vient de la conduite vitale, de l'expérience de la vie, de la structure de notre totalité psychique. L'élévation de la vie à la conscience dans la connaissance de la réalité, dans l'évaluation de la vie et dans la réalité volitive est le travail lent et ardu que l'humanité a fait dans le développement des conceptions de la vie. (W.Dilthey, 1992 [1911] : 120). Dans cet ouvrage, nous cherchons à esquisser une cosmovision fondée sur les réalités que la science offre aujourd'hui. Nous ne proposons, à aucun moment, de faire de la science ; ou théoriser la philosophie, mais nous chercherons toujours à être soutenus par eux ou, du moins, protégés par eux des distorsions cognitives que nous portons habituellement. -/- . (shrink)

RESUMO A inseminação artificial em tempo fixo (IATF) é uma das biotecnologias de reprodução mais estudadas dos últimos anos, e a busca pelo equilíbrio entre a fisiologia animal e o controle hormonal fomenta uma série de estudos. Sendo assim, o objetivo com este trabalho foi avaliar a eficiência da aplicação do hormônio liberador de gonadotrofinas (GnRH) no dia zero (D0) do protocolo de IATF, a base de estrógeno e progesterona sobre a taxa de penhez por IATF. O experimento foi desenvolvido (...) na Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU), na Fazenda Experimental do Glória, localizada no município de Uberlândia, no estado de Minas Gerais. Foram avaliadas 69 inseminações de vacas leiteiras mestiças, divididas em dois grupos com diferentes protocolos; Controle: sem aplicação de GnRH e Tratamento: aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo. Todos os animais foram inseminados com sêmen previamente analisado. O diagnóstico de gestação foi realizado 32 dias após a inseminação, com aparelho de ultrassonografia equipado com probe linear transretal de 7,5 MHz. Os dados foram analisados por análise descritiva, sendo avaliado o efeito da relação protocolo e presença de corpo lúteo no início do protocolo e efeito da relação protocolo e ordem de IA Pós-Parto sobre a taxa de concepção. A taxa de concepção após a realização do Protocolo Tratamento foi de 53% (17/32) e do Protocolo Controle foi de 43% (16/37). Portanto, conclui-se que o protocolo de sincronização de vacas leiteiras mestiças com a aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo resultou em um aumento no número da taxa de concepção de vacas leiteiras mestiças. Palavras-chave: biotecnologia; bovinocultura; hormônio; ovulação; reprodução. ABSTRACT The artificial insemination at fixed time (AIFT) is one of the most studied reproduction biotechnologies in recent years, and the search for a balance between animal physiology and hormonal control fosters a series of studies. Therefore, the objective of this work was to to evaluate the efficiency of gonadotrofine hormone inducer (GnRH) on day zero (D0) of the AIFT protocol, an estrogen and progesterone base on an AIFT rate. The experiment was developed at the Federal University of Uberlândia (UFU), at the Experimental Farm of Glória, located in the municipality of Uberlândia, in the state of Minas Gerais. Were evaluated 69 inseminations of crossbred dairy cows divided into two groups with different protocols; Control: without application of GnRH and Treatment: application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol. All animals were inseminated with previously analyzed semen. The diagnosis of pregnancy was performed 32 days after insemination, with an ultrasound device equipped with a 7.5 MHz transrectal linear probe. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, evaluating the effect of the protocol relationship and the presence of corpus luteum at the beginning of the protocol and the effect of the protocol relationship and postpartum AI order on the conception rate. The conception rate after performing of the Treatment Protocol was 53% (17/32) and the Control Protocol was 43% (16/37). Therefore, it is concluded that the synchronization protocol of crossbred dairy cows with the application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol resulted in an increase in the number of conception rates of crossbred dairy cows. Keywords: biotechnology; cattle breeding; hormone; ovulation; reproduction. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ATANASOV, A. S.; DINEVA, J. D.; YOTOV, S. A. 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Agropec., v.35, p.113-120, 2014. SARTORI, R. Manejo reprodutivo da fêmea leiteira. Reprodução Animal, Belo Horizonte, v.31, n.2, p.153-159, abr./jun. 2007. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022. SILVA, A. T. N. et al. Efeito de diferentes estratégias de manejo na distribuição da prenhez em vacas de corte mestiças paridas. In: XVI Congresso Brasileiro de Reprodução Animal. (Goiânia, Brasil). Resumo 158, 2007. SILVA, A.S. et al. Avaliação do custo benefício da inseminação artificial convencional e em tempo fixo de fêmeas bovinas pluríparas de corte. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v.31, n.4, p.443-445, 2007. SOUZA, A. H. et al. Efeitos da gonadotrofina coriônica equina e do tipo de estímulo ovulatório em um protocolo de IA cronometrada sobre as respostas reprodutivas em vacas leiteiras. Teriogenologia, Stoneham, v. 72, n. 1, pág. 10-21, 2009. STABENFELDT, G. H.; EDQVIST, L. E. Processos Reprodutivos da Fêmea. In: SWENSON, M. 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It is not by thinking that we create worlds. It is by understanding the world that we learn to think. Cosmovision is a term that should mean a set of foundations from which emerges a systemic understanding of the Universe, its components as life, the world we live in, nature, human phenomena, and their relationships. It is, therefore, a field of analytical philosophy fed by the sciences, whose objective is this aggregated and epistemologically sustainable knowledge about everything that we are (...) and contain, that surrounds us, and that relates to us in any way. It is something as old as human thought, and, in addition to using elements of scientific cosmology, it encompasses everything in philosophy and science that refers to the universe and life. A cosmovision is not a set of ideas, hypotheses, and assumptions but a system based on observation, analysis, evidence, and demonstration. No cosmovision intends to define, establish, or propose but only to understand, analyse, and interpret. Each of us builds and transports his cosmovision throughout life, without establishing forms, as a background for our thinking and behaviour. Linguistically, the term “cosmovision” would derive from the German, equivalent to the concept of “ Weltanschauung,” as used by several philosophers. However, this linguistic relationship is not applicable because it contradicts what we propose as a cosmovision. This German word refers to a pre-logical or proto- experimental vision of reality, with an intuitive context and far from critical knowledge still non-existent at the time of its formulation. Undoubtedly, cosmovisions, in the sense in which we understand them, house and use these proto-experimental or pre-logical elements that include history, the collective unconscious, and all the archetypes we carry. However, in the concept that we apply here, the cosmovision goes far beyond this content, firstly by constantly submitting it to present critical thinking, and finally by making the analytic experience ( and not the thought itself or intuition) its actual universe. António Lopes expose the breadth of this content: -/- "Cosmovisions are not the product of thought. They do not spring from the simple desire to know. The apprehension of reality is an important moment in its configuration, but, nevertheless, it is only one. It comes from the vital conduct, from the experience of life's evaluation, and from the structure of our psychic totality. The elevation of life to consciousness in the knowledge of reality, in the valuation, and in the volitional reality is the slow and arduous work that humanity has done in the development of the conceptions of life. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)”(1) -/- In this work, we seek to outline a cosmovision based on the realities that science offers today. We do not propose, at any time, to do science; or theorise philosophy, but we will always seek to be supported by them or, at least, protected by them from the cognitive distortions that we usually carry. ________________________________________________ (1) Lopes , Antonio – “ Weltanschauung (Cosmovision)” (2009 ) in Carlos Ceia's E-Dictionary of Literary Terms. -/- . (shrink)

Kosmovisi Adalah Istilah yang seharusnya berarti seperangkat fondasi yang darinya muncul pemahaman sistemik tentang Alam Semesta, komponen-komponennya sebagai kehidupan, dunia tempat kita hidup, alam, fenomena manusia, dan hubungan mereka. Oleh karena itu, ini adalah bidang filsafat analitis yang disuplai oleh ilmu pengetahuan, yang tujuannya adalah pengetahuan yang terkumpul dan berkelanjutan secara epistemologis tentang segala sesuatu yang ada dan terkandung dalam diri kita, yang mengelilingi kita, dan yang berhubungan dengan kita dengan cara apa pun. Ini adalah sesuatu yang sama tuanya dengan (...) pemikiran manusia, dan, selain menggunakan unsur-unsur kosmologi ilmiah, ini mencakup segala sesuatu dalam filsafat dan sains yang mengacu pada alam semesta dan kehidupan. Kosmovisi bukanlah sekumpulan ide, hipotesis, dan asumsi, melainkan sebuah sistem yang didasarkan pada observasi, analisis, bukti, dan demonstrasi. Tidak ada kosmovisi yang bermaksud untuk mendefinisikan, menetapkan, atau mengusulkan, tetapi hanya memahami, menganalisis, dan menafsirkan. Masing-masing dari kita membangun dan membawa kosmovisi-nya sepanjang hidup, tanpa menetapkan bentuk, sebagai latar belakang pemikiran dan perilaku kita. Secara linguistic, Istilah "kosmovisi" akan berasal dari padanan bahasa Jerman untuk konsep "Weltanschauung", seperti yang digunakan oleh beberapa filsuf. Namun, hubungan linguistic ini tidak dapat diterapkan karena bertentangan dengan apa yang kami usulkan sebagai kosmovisi. Kata Jerman ini mengacu pada visi pra-logis atau proto-eksperimental tentang realitas, dengan konteks intuitif dan jauh dari pengetahuan kritis yang masih belum ada pada saat perumusannya. Tidak diragukan lagi, kosmovisi, dalam pengertian yang kita pahami, menampung dan menggunakan elemen-elemen proto-eksperimental atau pra-logis yang mencakup sejarah, ketidaksadaran kolektif, dan semua pola dasar yang kita bawa. Namun, dalam konsep yang kami terapkan di sini, kosmovisi jauh melampaui konten ini, pertama-tama dengan terus-menerus menyerahkannya untuk menghadirkan pemikiran kritis dan akhirnya dengan menjadikan pengalaman analitik (dan bukan pemikiran itu sendiri atau intuisi) sebagai alam semesta yang sebenarnya. António Lopes memaparkan luasnya konten ini: -/- "Kosmovisi bukanlah produk dari pemikiran. Mereka tidak muncul dari keinginan sederhana untuk mengetahui. Pemahaman tentang realitas adalah momen penting dalam konfigurasinya, tetapi, bagaimanapun, itu hanya satu. Itu berasal dari perilaku vital, dari pengalaman hidup, dari struktur totalitas psikis kita. Peningkatan kehidupan menuju kesadaran dalam pengetahuan tentang realitas, dalam penilaian kehidupan dan dalam realitas kehendak adalah pekerjaan yang lambat dan sulit yang telah dilakukan umat manusia dalam pengembangan konsepsi kehidupan. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)" . Dalam karya ini, kami berusaha menguraikan sebuah visi kosmik berdasarkan realitas yang ditawarkan sains saat ini. Kami tidak mengusulkan, kapan pun, untuk melakukan sains atau berteori tentang filsafat. Namun, kami akan selalu berusaha untuk didukung oleh mereka atau, setidaknya, dilindungi oleh mereka dari distorsi kognitif yang biasanya kita bawa. (shrink)

Ang Diyos ay hindi naglalaro ng dado", inulit ni Einstein mula sa taas ng kanyang determinismo, ngunit sa katunayan ang kosmos ay naghahagis ng mga buto nito nang sadyang mapagpasya: ang mga dado nito ay laruin. Hindi sa pag-iisip na tayo ay lumikha ng mga mundo. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-unawa sa mundo natututo tayong mag-isip. Ang Cosmovision ay isang termino na dapat ay nangangahulugang isang hanay ng mga pundasyon kung saan lumalabas ang isang sistematikong pag-unawa sa Uniberso, ang mga bahagi (...) nito bilang buhay, ang mundong ating ginagalawan, kalikasan, mga phenomena ng tao, at ang kanilang mga relasyon. Ito ay, samakatuwid, isang larangan ng analytical na pilosopiya na pinapakain ng mga agham, na ang layunin ay ang pinagsama-samang at epistemologically sustainable na kaalaman tungkol sa lahat ng kung ano tayo at nilalaman, na nakapaligid sa atin, at nauugnay sa atin sa anumang paraan. Ito ay isang bagay na kasingtanda ng pag-iisip ng tao, at, bilang karagdagan sa paggamit ng mga elemento ng siyentipikong kosmolohiya, sinasaklaw nito ang lahat ng bagay sa pilosopiya at agham na tumutukoy sa uniberso at buhay. Ang cosmovision ay hindi isang set ng mga ideya, hypotheses, at assumptions kundi isang sistemang batay sa obserbasyon, pagsusuri, ebidensya, at pagpapakita. Walang cosmovision na naglalayong tukuyin, itatag, o imungkahi ngunit para lamang maunawaan, suriin, at bigyang-kahulugan. Bawat isa sa atin ay nagtatayo at naghahatid ng kanyang kosmobisyon sa buong buhay, nang hindi nagtatatag ng mga anyo, bilang isang background para sa ating pag-iisip at pag-uugali. Sa lingguwistika, ang terminong "cosmovision" ay magmumula sa Aleman, katumbas ng konsepto ng "Weltanschauung," na ginamit ng ilang mga pilosopo. Gayunpaman, ang relasyong pangwika na ito ay hindi naaangkop dahil sumasalungat ito sa aming iminumungkahi bilang isang cosmovision. Ang salitang Aleman na ito ay tumutukoy sa isang pre-logical o proto- experimental na pananaw ng realidad, na may intuitive na konteksto at malayo sa kritikal na kaalaman na wala pa rin sa oras ng pagbabalangkas nito. Walang alinlangan, ang mga cosmovision, sa diwa kung saan natin nauunawaan ang mga ito, ay nagtataglay at gumagamit ng mga proto-experimental o pre-logical na elementong ito na kinabibilangan ng kasaysayan, ang sama-samang walang malay, at lahat ng mga archetype na dala natin. Gayunpaman, sa konseptong inilalapat natin dito, ang cosmovision ay higit na lumalampas sa nilalamang ito, una sa pamamagitan ng patuloy na pagsusumite nito upang ipakita ang kritikal na pag-iisip, at sa wakas sa pamamagitan ng paggawa ng analitikong karanasan (at hindi ang kaisipan mismo o intuwisyon) ang aktwal nitong uniberso. Inilantad ni António Lopes ang lawak ng nilalamang ito: "Ang mga cosmovision ay hindi produkto ng pag-iisip. Hindi sila nagmumula sa simpleng pagnanais na malaman. Ang pagkaunawa sa katotohanan ay isang mahalagang sandali sa pagsasaayos nito, ngunit, gayunpaman, ito ay isa lamang. Ito ay nagmumula sa mahahalagang pag-uugali, mula sa karanasan ng pagsusuri sa buhay, at mula sa istruktura ng ating saykiko na kabuuan Ang pagtaas ng buhay sa kamalayan sa kaalaman sa realidad, sa pagpapahalaga, at sa kusang katotohanan ay ang mabagal at mahirap na gawain. na ginawa ng sangkatauhan sa pagbuo ng mga konsepto ng buhay (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120). Sa gawaing ito, hinahangad nating balangkasin ang isang kosmobisyon batay sa mga realidad na inaalok natin ngayon hindi nagmumungkahi, sa anumang oras, na gumawa ng agham; o magteorya ng pilosopiya, ngunit lagi nating hahanapin na suportahan sila o, hindi bababa sa, protektahan nila mula sa mga pang-unawang distorsyon na karaniwan nating dala. (shrink)

In recent years, online “involuntary celibate” or “incel” communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence toward women—for their oscillation between obsessive desire and violent hatred. (...) I propose instead that what incels want is a Beauvoirian “Other.” For Beauvoir, when men conceive of women as Others, they represent them as simultaneously human subjects and embodiments of the natural world. Women function then as sui generis entities through which men can experience themselves as praiseworthy heroes, regardless of the quality of their actions. I go on to give an illustrative analysis of Elliot Rodger’s autobiographical manifesto, “My Twisted World.” I show how this Beauvoirian model sheds light on Rodger’s racist and classist attitudes and gives us a better understanding of his ambivalence toward women. It therefore constitutes a powerful and overlooked theoretical alternative to accounts centered on objectification and entitlement. (shrink)

At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone de (...) Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism: a form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one’s life. Framing Margot as a narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today – well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance. (shrink)

One of the key insights of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is the idea that gender-based subordination is not just something done to women, but also something women do to themselves. This raises a question about ethical responsibility: if women are complicit, or actively implicated in their own oppression, are they at fault? Recent Beauvoir scholarship remains divided on this point. Here, I argue that Beauvoir did, in fact, ethically criticize many women for their complicity, as a sign of (...) what she called “bad faith”. I challenge recent accounts by Nancy Bauer and Manon Garcia, who both read Beauvoir as exonerating complicit women. According to this reading, women emerge as human “freedoms” within a social world where a “destiny” of inferiority is already prepared for them. Their self-subordination is then an inevitable product of acting in a patriarchal world. I argue, however, that this interpretation generates a crucial tension, leading Bauer and Garcia to call on women to stop being complicit, while also claiming they cannot avoid complicity. I propose instead a different interpretation, on which feminine complicity is often fueled by criticizable ethical attitudes that are far from inevitable. By revisiting Beauvoir’s notion of “bad faith”, I show that this account is compatible with recognizing the limitations imposed on women’s agency and I show that this feminist ethical criticism is itself an important part of a collective project of social transformation. (shrink)

The idea that women qua women can be dehumanized has been dismissed by feminist philosophers, like Kate Manne, and by philosophers of dehumanization, like David Livingstone Smith. Against these skeptics, I argue that we can and should use dehumanization to explain an important strand of misogyny. When they are dehumanized, women are represented simultaneously as human and as inhuman embodiments of the natural world. They therefore appear as magical, contaminating, sexualized threats towards whom violence is acceptable or even necessary. Misogynistic (...) dehumanization is important to understanding atrocities like the early modern European witch-hunts, but also contemporary phenomena like incel violence. (shrink)

This paper compares Nietzsche ́s views on the relationship between philosophical reflection and empirical sciences against the background of some of the debates in the so-called transcendental tradition, in order to characterize his position in terms of a liberal kind of methodological naturalism. Initially, it will be shown that there are some similarities between the debates in the German academic philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century and the Postquinean contemporary debates on naturalism. I discuss subsequently F. A. (...) Lange ́s historical views concerning the emergence of methodical discipline within the materialistic tradition, as well as Nietzsche ́s reception of them. Next, I present Spir ́s arguments against the naturalizing programs of his time, as well as Nietzsche ́s response to him. In the last section, I discuss the meaning of Nietzsche ́s orientation to a speculative philosophy of the will to power in his late works and whether it is compatible or not with his more liberal conception of naturalism mainly supported in his middle period works. (shrink)

Hume once argued the basic science to be not physics but “the science of man” and the foundation of this science to be the empiricist mechanism of association governed by the law of similarity in appearance—now more popular than ever in the form of artificial neural networks. I update Hume’s picture by showing phenomenology to be centrally concerned with providing a unifying basis for all the sciences (including physics) by going beyond the psychology of associationism (passive synthesis) to reveal phenomena (...) that are irreducibly syntactic (not associative) in structure. I therefore argue that the language of thought (LOT) is the necessary mechanism at the basis of these descriptive phenomena. I conclude by sketching a new picture of all the sciences unified by LOT based on Husserl’s opposition to Galilean “physicomathematical” science vis-à-vis the life-world (Lebenswelt). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is, firstly, to present some reasons why source criticism is a particularly promising methodological approach when applied to Nietzsche’s work. Starting from a first taxonomy, devoted to the various methodological approaches in the history of philosophy, I argue that source criticism is particularly well suited to dealing with Nietzsche’s work, due to the enthymematic nature of the ways he presents his arguments as well as to the nature of some of his substantive philosophical commitments (such (...) as ethical perfectionism and descriptive fictionalism). Next, I propose a second taxonomy, which classifies the variety of connections Nietzsche establishes with his philosophical sources: spiritual affinity, programmatic commitment and instrumental appropriation. (shrink)

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

This paper discusses two theses about Plato that Nietzsche defends in his lectures on the Athenian philosopher offered by him at the University of Basel during the 1870s. Nietzsche’s first claim concerns Plato’s philosophy: relying on Aristotle, Nietzsche holds that Plato was initially brought to a metaphysically motivated version of scepticism as a result of his affiliation to the Cratilian interpretation of Heraclitus. Although the Socratic method of defining and testing concepts as well as its metaphysical complement, the theory of (...) Forms, has allowed Plato to overcome this kind of metaphysically motivated scepticism, Nietzsche argues that such an overcoming is only provisional if one needs to accept the authenticity of Parmenides, then the arguments displayed in this later dialogue lead to a sceptical conclusion regarding the theory of Forms. The second claim advanced by Nietzsche in his lectures concerns Plato’s philosophical character, which is identified with the figures of the legislator and the political reformer. According to Nietzsche, all of Plato’s philosophical commitments must ultimately be interpreted in the light of his political project, for here there is no place for scepticism anymore. (shrink)

The representations of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are formed from generalizing similarities and abstracting from differences in the manner of the empiricist theory of abstraction (Buckner, Synthese 195:5339–5372, 2018). The empiricist theory of abstraction is well understood to entail infinite regress and circularity in content constitution (Husserl, Logical Investigations. Routledge, 2001). This paper argues these entailments hold a fortiori for deep CNNs. Two theses result: deep CNNs require supplementation by Quine’s “apparatus of identity and quantification” in order to (1) (...) achieve concepts, and (2) represent objects, as opposed to “half-entities” corresponding to similarity amalgams (Quine, Quintessence, Cambridge, 2004, p. 107). Similarity amalgams are also called “approximate meaning[s]” (Marcus & Davis, Rebooting AI, Pantheon, 2019, p. 132). Although Husserl inferred the “complete abandonment of the empiricist theory of abstraction” (a fortiori deep CNNs) due to the infinite regress and circularity arguments examined in this paper, I argue that the statistical learning of deep CNNs may be incorporated into a Fodorian hybrid account that supports Quine’s “sortal predicates, negation, plurals, identity, pronouns, and quantifiers” which are representationally necessary to overcome the regress/circularity in content constitution and achieve objective (as opposed to similarity-subjective) representation (Burge, Origins of Objectivity. Oxford, 2010, p. 238). I base myself initially on Yoshimi’s (New Frontiers in Psychology, 2011) attempt to explain Husserlian phenomenology with neural networks but depart from him due to the arguments and consequently propose a two-system view which converges with Weiskopf’s proposal (“Observational Concepts.” The Conceptual Mind. MIT, 2015. 223–248). (shrink)

Yoshimi has attempted to defuse my argument concerning the identification of network abstraction with empiricist abstraction - thus entailing psychologism - by claiming that the argument does not generalize from the example of simple feed-forward networks. I show that the particular details of networks are logically irrelevant to the nature of the abstractive process they employ. This is ultimately because deep artificial neural networks (ANNs) and dynamical systems theory applied to the mind (DST) are both associationisms - that is, empiricist (...) theories that derive the principles of thought from the causal history of the organism/system. On this basis, I put forward a new aspect of the old argument by noting that ANNs & DST are the causal bases of the phenomena of passive synthesis, whereas the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) and the symbolic computational theory of mind (CTM) are the causal bases of the phenomena of active synthesis. If the phenomena of active synthesis are not distinct in kind from and are thus reducible to those of passive synthesis, psychologism results. Yoshimi’s program, insofar as it denies this fundamental phenomenological distinction, is revealed to be the true anti-pluralist program, by essentially denying the causal efficacy of the mechanistic foundations of active synthesis by referring phenomenology exclusively to associationism for its causal foundation. (shrink)

Nietzsche mobiliza recursos retóricos de natureza heterogênea em sua obra, que podem ser distribuídos em pelo menos quatro grandes rubricas: elementos que (1) incidem sobre a materialidade sonora e rítmica da linguagem (dimensão expressiva associada à prova ética); (2) orientam a adoção de um conjunto de estratégias argumentativas que variam conforme as necessidades filosóficas do momento (dimensão argumentativa ou dialética); (3) dizem respeito a escolhas relativas à forma de apresentação dos argumentos, ou à sua inserção no interior de diferentes gêneros (...) literários (aqui vale a tese do pluralismo defendida por Nehamas, pois Nietzsche explora as potencialidades de diferentes formas de apresentação para as suas ideias, sendo a principal delas um gênero híbrido que incorpora elementos do aforismo e do ensaio); finalmente, (4) retomam aspectos relativos à invenção (dimensão heurística do paradigma indiciário, com a valorização da inferência abdutiva). Neste artigo pretendo mostrar, através de uma caracterização sumária da prática discursiva de Nietzsche, assim como de uma rápida retomada de sua tematização da retórica, como essas diversas dimensões (expressiva, inventiva, argumentativa e expositiva) se integram em seu projeto filosófico, tornando-se uma parte constitutiva do mesmo. Essa leitura se contrapõe a uma tradição que nega relevância filosófica à dimensão retórica da obra de Nietzsche, relegando-a a uma suposta dimensão exotérica de seus escritos. Há formas implícitas e explícitas pelas quais um intérprete pode chegar a esse resultado. Dentre as formas implícitas de contornar o desafio retórico posto pela filosofia de Nietzsche, a mais célebre é a de Heidegger. Ela se funda em sua decisão filologicamente controversa, no limite indefensável, de conferir primazia aos póstumos em detrimento dos livros publicados pelo filósofo, que deveriam, segundo ele, ser tomados como fachada. Paul de Man representa a forma explícita dessa recusa, mas com resultados curiosamente próximos aos de Heidegger, ainda que movido por intenções filosóficas distintas. No presente ensaio recuso ambas as estratégias de evasão e procuro mostrar que os diversos aspectos retóricos presentes na obra de Nietzsche se integram de forma relativamente harmônica ao seu projeto filosófico de cunho perfeccionista. (shrink)

Embora não o desenvolva na exposição que se segue, o argumento subjacente à minha contribuição para este volume é bastante simples: há duas vias pelas quais a filosofia de Nietzsche pode contribuir positivamente para uma revisão do modo como os seres humanos no ocidente definiram sua relação com o não humano: (1) a primeira via é a agonística – a tese agonística pode ser mobilizada para combater o viés especista que caracteriza boa parte da reflexão normativa do ocidente sem que (...) isso nos comprometa com a suposição de que é possível abandonar o perspectivismo em sua versão forte (a tese segundo a qual nossos esquemas conceituais e perceptuais, ou o fato de pertencermos a uma mesma história natural, nos aprisionam na perspectiva da espécie humana). O agonismo é uma posição filosófica que recusa a supremacia absoluta de uma formação de domínio como um arranjo prejudicial à própria formação de domínio; (2) a segunda via é a da filosofia da afirmação incondicional do acaso ou da necessidade, como Nietzsche se expressa alternativamente. Esta via comporta uma dimensão religiosa, por mais chocante que isso possa parecer a ouvidos nietzschianos. Nesta perspectiva da afirmação incondicional, todas as forças atuantes são igualmente afirmadas e a perspectiva normativa preservada minimamente na abordagem agonística é como que suprimida e toda tensão dissolvida. Segundo minha interpretação, a filosofia afirmativa defendida por Nietzsche exige uma política da reconciliação que vai além da perspectiva agonística. Ela representa a superação da visão moral de mundo na sua forma mais drástica: com um dizer sim até mesmo à perspectiva do último homem. Mas é justamente aí que as coisas começam a assumir ares dramáticos, pois Nietzsche reconhece que esta perspectiva não pode ser facilmente aceita em suas diversas implicações. Embora as duas vias que acabamos de mencionar possam inspirar legitimamente o projeto de uma revisão do antropocentrismo que caracterizou a reflexão normativa no ocidente, é necessário reconhecer que alguns traços do pensamento nietzschiano tornam esta tarefa de revisão altamente improvável. Uma vez assumida, a segunda via exigiria, por exemplo, a supressão de um dos traços centrais da personalidade filosófica de Nietzsche. Refiro-me a seu incansável ativismo em prol da autossuperação dos tipos mais elevados da humanidade. Esta dificuldade revela uma das facetas mais importantes da filosofia de Nietzsche, que consiste em seu compromisso com uma forma depurada de humanismo; um compromisso radical, que não pode ser ignorado por seus leitores. Esta forma depurada de humanismo fornece a autorização teórica para o lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana: seu flerte com a noção de uma história planificada e de uma administração global da terra, como forma de promover o cultivo dos homens de exceção. Este lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana pode ser descrito como um desdobramento consequencialista de sua ética perfeccionista, e está na origem das derivações políticas que o filósofo alemão extrai deste compromisso ético. Penso que isso justifique a expressão hiperbólica utilizada no título de minha contribuição: “A catástrofe do humanismo”. Sempre que esta modalidade de humanismo depurado prevalece na reflexão de Nietzsche, a única voz perceptível nesta que é a mais polifônica das escritas filosóficas é a voz do ativista militando em prol dos homens de exceção. Quando esse tipo de engajamento prevalece, não é possível discernir nenhuma contribuição especificamente nietzschiana ao tema em torno do qual nos propusemos a refletir nesta coletânea: nestas ocasiões Nietzsche permanece indubitavelmente no interior de uma tradição que confere exclusividade ao humano em sua reflexão normativa. (shrink)

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

Ziel meines Beitrages ist die These zu vertreten, dass das Triebmodell Nietzsches durch eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem schopenhauerianischen Prinzip des Willens zum Leben entwickelt wurde. Dieses Modell lässt sich als einen durchgehenden Versuch interpretieren, mit den begrifflichen Schwierigkeiten der Willensmetaphysik Schopenhauers umzugehen, die Nietzsche bereits im Jahre 1868 in der Leipziger Aufzeichnungen identifiziert hat. Was Nietzsche für besonderes verwerflich an dem Projekt Schopenhauers einer post-Kantischen Metaphysik hält, das ist im Wesentliche die Tatsache, dass er bei Durchführung dieses Projektes den alten (...) Dualismus von Leib und Seele durch einen neuen Dualismus, der Dualismus von Willen und Vorstellung, bzw. Willen und Verstand ersetzt hat. Der neue Dualismus Schopenhauers resultiert aus einer Reform unseres vorreflexiven Willensbegriffes. Bei dieser Reform habe Schopenhauer, so Nietzsche, die intentionale Qualität des Wollens „heraus subtrahirt“, so dass was „er ‚Wille‘ nennt“ „ein blosses leeres Wort“ sei (KSA, 13, 14[121], S. 301). Noch wichtiger als die Pluralität ist in Nietzsches Augen die Intentionalität, die als ein wesentliches Merkmal des Willensbegriffes gilt. Wollen und Vorstellen sind nicht ‚losgetrennt zu denken‘; von Wollen zu reden „ohne von vornherein einen Intellekt anzunehmen, der sich vorstellen konnte was man will“ macht keinen Sinn, weil „einen solchen Willen in’s Blaue (oder in’s Dasein!) giebt es nicht“ (KSA, 9, 4[310], S. 178). Das Triebmodell Nietzsches ist eine begriffliche Entfaltung dieser prinzipiellen Nicht-Übereinstimmung. Während Schopenhauer seine Willensmetaphysik aus dem Modell des Begehrens konzipiert, dem zufolge „wir werden durch unsere Begierden gelenkt: nicht durch unsere nützlichen und vernünftigen Interessen, geschweige durch unsere Tugend und Weisheit“ (KSA, 9, 5[27], S. 187), hat Nietzsche sich entschieden, „sich der Analogie des Menschen zu Ende [zu] bedienen“ (KSA, 11, 36[31], S. 563), d. h., bei seiner theoretischen Philosophie eine Anthropomorphisierungsstrategie zu verfolgen. Diese Strategie kann insoweit legitimiert werden, als man fähig ist, unser menschliches Bild von moralischen Vorstellungen und Gefühle zu befreien und „den Menschen nämlich zurück[zu]übersetzen in die Natur; über die vielen eitlen und schwärmerischen Deutungen und Nebensinne Herr [zu]werden, welche bisher über jenen ewigen Grundtext homo natura gekritzelt und gemalt wurden [...]“ (JGB, 230). Ein realistisch konzipiertes politisches Modell, wobei die Macht als Hauptbegriff auftritt, erlaubt Nietzsche unser triebhaftes Leben zu beschreiben, ohne unsere nützlichen und vernünftigen Interessen, unsere Tugend, Weisheit und Dummheit, unsere kompromiss- und vertragsfähige Natur ausklammern zu müssen. Zum Schluss unseres Beitrages wird die Frage gestellt, inwieweit das aus dem politischen Bereich konzipierte Triebmodell zu dem sogenannten Homunkulus-Fehlschluss führt und inwieweit diese Art von Fehlschluss zu vermeiden ist. (shrink)

The first part of my paper offers a brief characterization of what I call the non-hegemonic tradition of interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphilosophical program. In the second part, I suggest some small adjustments in the main argument of this tradition of interpretation. In general terms, the non-hegemonic tradition can be characterised by the claim that Nietzsche is a legitimate heir of the metaphilosophical programme first formulated by Friedrich Albert Lange in his ˜History of Materialism and Critique of its Significance for the (...) Present". None of the main interpreters of Nietzsche that I affiliate with this tradition of interpretation has formulated this claim quite explicitly, but I do not think that this characterization is inappropriate and I submit they could all accept it in the terms put forward in the present article. The main thesis states that Lange provides Nietzsche not so much with substantive theses as with the formal aspects of a philosophical programme whose content is drawn from other sources. This is the case, for example, in the attempt (in his early works) to mobilise Schopenhauer's metaphysics without committing himself to his epistemic claims. The attempt to execute this programme is surrounded by tensions that result not so much from Lange's sceptical theses as from what ultimately motivates them: the imperative of intellectual consciousness. This conflict remains unresolved as long as Nietzsche remains committed to the thesis of practical idealism according to which it is up to philosophy to satisfy certain metaphysical needs that are anthropologically unavoidable. The commitment to this anthropological thesis is what effectively places the young Nietzsche in the company of Kant, Schopenhauer and Lange. As soon as Nietzsche has abandoned this youthful commitment, he is prepared to revise his metaphilosophical convictions. (shrink)

A hipótese que procuro defender neste ensaio é a seguinte: a famosa expressão " Am Leitfaden des Leibes", que surge nos póstumos de 1884 e desaparece um ano depois, contabilizando pouco mais de dez ocorrências no conjunto dos fragmentos póstumos e nenhuma na obra publicada, é uma expressão cujo sentido e intenção devem ser desvendados tendo como pano de fundo o crescente interesse de Nietzsche, na virada da primeira para a segunda metade dos anos oitenta, na reabilitação da atividade especulativa. (...) Minha segunda hipótese é que, ao cunhar esta expressão, Nietzsche se inspira na reivindicação metodológica de Schopenhauer, segundo a qual o corpo é o único fio condutor que nos resta se queremos nos mover com alguma segurança pelo labirinto da especulação. Por "corpo próprio‘" (Leib), Schopenhauer designa um tipo específico de experiência intuitiva que teria sido negligenciada por Kant: a experiência do conjunto de nossa vida afetiva. Segundo a minha hipótese, a partir da segunda metade dos anos oitenta Nietzsche estaria disposto a reconhecer que a intuição metodológica de Schopenhauer estava correta. O erro de Schopenhauer teria consistido simplesmente em partir de uma concepção equivocada do corpo e do tipo de acesso que temos a ele. A divergência, portanto, não incidiria sobre o método próprio à especulação, mas sobre o conteúdo ao qual o método se aplicaria, ou seja, sobre a representação do corpo próprio e dos traços que lhe seriam essenciais. Persistem as divergências quanto ao que implica seguir este preceito metódico (por exemplo, sobre o que deve e o que não deve ser evitado no antropomorfismo subjacente ao método de projeção analógica), ou quanto ao meio mais apropriado de se obter uma representação do corpo próprio. Segundo Schopenhauer, nós teríamos uma intuição do que é essencial no corpo mediante a experiência imediata do querer. Segundo Nietzsche, somente após um longo e penoso processo que envolve tanto a investigação empírica quanto a reflexão conceitual chegamos a alguns resultados tímidos. Portanto, mesmo a especulação que se serve do corpo como fio condutor representa uma extrapolação em relação ao que estaríamos autorizados a inferir em um ambiente epistemicamente mais rigoroso. E isso não apenas pela razão de que a inferência analógica é por si mesma uma inferência logicamente abusiva (mas tolerável, na ausência de outro recurso), mas também pelo fato de que aquilo que serve de base para a inferência analógica é uma imagem seletiva e arbitrariamente construída, cuja legitimidade epistêmica, mesmo quando restrita ao domínio da fisiologia humana, é apenas relativa. Estas considerações fornecem parte das razões (as de ordem epistêmica) de porque Nietzsche nunca conseguiu se persuadir inteiramente de que o seu projeto de reabilitação da filosofia especulativa era legítimo. Esta indecisão o levou a postergar e, segundo alguns intérpretes, a finalmente abandonar a sua execução, ou pelo menos a sua tradução em uma obra literária sistemática. (shrink)

Os projetos de psicologia científica enfrentam pelo menos duas ameaças. A primeira delas surge quando uma proposta de psicologia tenta seguir os cânones da ciência moderna. Nesse caso, torna-se necessário "objetivar o fenômeno psicológico", o que, geralmente, é feito por meio da sua tradução em termos fisiológicos. Mas, nesse ponto, a especificidade da psicologia é ameaçada pelo reducionismo fisiológico. A segunda ameaça aparece quando um projeto de psicologia tenta evitar o reducionismo fisiológico defendendo a natureza subjetiva irredutível do fenômeno psicológico. (...) No entanto, isso coloca uma série de dificuldades metodológicas. Dessa maneira, a segunda ameaça às propostas de psicologia científica é o mentalismo, que impõe limitações ao emprego do método científico. O presente ensaio tem o objetivo de mostrar como o projeto de psicologia científica de Tolman pode ser visto como uma alternativa a essas duas ameaças. Em primeiro lugar, examinamos em que medida a concepção de comportamento como fenômeno molar afasta Tolman do reducionismo fisiológico. Em seguida, analisamos algumas dificuldades decorrentes dessa proposta, em especial, as limitações inerentes à epistemologia realista - adotada inicialmente por Tolman. Por fim, apresentamos a proposta tolmaniana de superação dessas dificuldades: trata-se da analogia entre teorias científicas e mapas, que revela a adoção de uma epistemologia instrumentalista por Tolman. (shrink)

This paper addresses the following problem: to what extent do ontological considerations about musical works affect our evaluation of performances of those works? I argue for the claim that at least some important grounds on which performances are evaluated are specific to them, in that these grounds are either independent from, or related but not fully determined by, the properties of the works they are of. In the first part of the paper, I explore the relations between good-making features of (...) works and of performances of them. The second and third parts develop two kinds of example in favour of the claim above. In the last part, I discuss the significance of those examples in relation to the ways in which performances are assessed, and explore some further ramifications of them. (shrink)

Ziel meines Aufsatzes ist es, die Frage zu stellen, ob die Art und Weise, wie Nietzsche sich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft bezieht, mithilfe des zeitgenössischen methodologischen Naturalismus beschrieben werden kann. Leiter (2009) hat diese Frage mit einem entschiedenen Ja beantwortet, ohne jedoch die Spannungen, die eine solche Antwort mit sich bringen, ausführlich zu diskutieren. Zumindest aus zwei Gründen scheint die Philosophie Nietzsches sich mit der stärkeren Version des methodologischen Naturalismus nicht so leicht in Einklang bringen zu lassen: (...) Erstens aufgrund des Prinzips des Willens zur Macht, das die These impliziert, dass das Intentionalitätsvokabular primitiver bzw. gründlicher als das physikalistische Vokabular sei, als einer Konsequenz aus der Verwendung des pragmatischen Prinzips der Sparsamkeit auf die ontologische Debatte (JGB 36, KSA 5, 54 f.); zweitens aufgrund Nietzsches Auffassung der spezifischen Aufgabe der Philosophie als einer normativen Aufgabe (JGB 211, KSA 5, 144 f.; GM I Anmerkung, KSA 5, 289). Gegen die starke Interpretation Leiters werden hier die folgenden Thesen vertreten: Nietzsche kann nur insofern als ein Vertreter des methodologischen Naturalismus betrachtet werden, als er der Auffassung ist, dass der Philosoph epistemische Tugenden erst dann gewinnt, wenn er sich mit einer wissenschaftlichen Methode vertraut macht (MA I 256, KSA 2, 212). Das bedeutet, dass er sich zumindest vorläufig den Regeln unterwirft, die innerhalb einer bestimmten wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft gelten (MA I 635, KSA 2, 360 f.; JGB 188, KSA 5, 108 ff.). Der Philosoph soll dies tun, um die epistemischen Tugenden zu erlangen, die für die normative Aufgabe der Philosophie unentbehrlich sind. Diese epistemischen Tugenden sind wesentlich skeptischer Natur. Sie zu kultivieren, bedeutet sicherlich, epistemische Werte zu fördern, nicht aber unbedingt für sie (AC 54, KSA 6, 236 f.), geschweige denn für ein kausales, bzw. monokausales Erklärungsmodell Exklusivität beanspruchen zu müssen (JGB 21, KSA 5, 35 f.). (shrink)

Este artigo aborda as principais teorias sobre a natureza metafísica das obras de arte, cobrindo as propostas eliminativistas, monistas e pluralistas. Entre estas últimas, é dado destaque ao trabalho sobre a ontologia das artes performativas, e em particular, da música. Termina-se com uma referência à recente viragem da discussão para o campo da meta-ontologia e a polémica sobre a plausibilidade do revisionismo ontológico no caso de artefactos ou objectos sociais.

O artigo parte do consenso sobre a facto de que a arte tem valor para a exploração dos vários problemas sobre esse valor cujas soluções dividem os filósofos da arte. O enfoque é especialmente sobre a dimensão mais actual do debate em torno do tema, que se debruça não tanto sobre questões como o realismo quanto aos valores estéticos e a objectividade e justificação dos juízos de valor estético, mas acima de tudo sobre a natureza do valor artístico – que (...) tipo de valor é e em que propriedades da arte (se nalguma) reside. (shrink)

The paper addresses the issue of ethical obligations in the performance of musical works in the Western classical tradition, arguing that there are indeed such obligations, although they are not categorical. -/- PT: Na tradição clássica ocidental, as obras de arte musicais, teatrais e, até certo ponto, as coreografias, são criadas por artistas-autores, mas necessitam de ser executadas por intérpretes (instrumentistas, cantores e maestros, actores e encenadores, bailarinos, etc.). Estes são assim chamados porque existe sempre uma dose de descricionariedade, não (...) só nas suas decisões sobre o que as instruções inscritas na notação por parte do autor querem "realmente" dizer, como ainda acerca dos muitos aspectos necessária ou voluntariamente deixados em aberto por ele. Limitando-nos aos casos em que é evidente ou relativamente claro que o autor favorece, directamente ou por via das convenções artísticas por si tacitamente aceites, uma forma de interpretação da sua obra entre outras, debruço-me sobre a questão de saber se, para além das considerações estéticas integrantes da decisão de respeitar total ou parcialmente essa forma, há também considerações especificamente morais que sejam relevantes para tal decisão. Os tratamentos filosóficos desta questão tiveram alguma expressão nos anos 80 e 90, sobretudo a propósito do movimento da interpretação musical historicamente correcta ou informada de obras de épocas com as quais se estava a recuperar o contacto perdido em termos de modos de execução e instrumentos específicos dessas épocas. Curiosamente, contrastando com o debate entre a crítica de arte, o debate filosófico é muito menos vivo numa actualidade marcada pelo ecletismo pós-moderno que, sobretudo no teatro e na ópera, trata mesmo os aspectos mais estruturantes das obras como completamente opcionais, ou as obras elas as próprias como materiais para fusão, reconstrução ou improvisação. Revisitando os argumentos em torno do tópico, defenderei a prevalência da posição segundo a qual há uma dimensão moral nas artes performativas, mas que as obrigações daí resultantes não são todas categóricas, tendo diferentes graus de força, e devem ser entendidas como uma variável que tem de ser, em cada caso, ponderada lado a lado com as considerações estéticas. (shrink)

The present thesis intends the reconstruction of Nietzsche’s dialogue with the history of scepticism through the identification of his main sources. Such dialogue is constantly mediated by texts from authors contemporary to Nietzsche, therefore the reconstruction of the sources could not remain exclusively inside the sceptical tradition, but included frequently some post-Kantian authors. The fundamental claims of the present thesis are: Nietzsche was deeply acquainted with the history of scepticism; his work assumes this tradition in a very innovative manner; Nietzsche (...) not only associated himself instrumentally to scepticism, but tried to incorporate some of the essential commitments of the sceptical life to his understanding of philosophical life. (shrink)